In Germany it’s one 12-year term, generous pension afterwards. Minimum age 40, maximum age 68 or their terms ends prematurely once their successor is appointed. They have to be actual jurists (passed 2nd state exam and/or are a professor of law). Half are elected by the Bundestag (Parliament), half by the Bundesrat (representing the states), in both cases with 2/3rd majority. Ultimately appointed by the Federal President but not in a deciding role but acting as notary of the state.
That 2/3rd majority rule has, because no party can reach it on their own, led to bench seats being allocated proportionally to electoral results, parties picking their favourite out of the possible candidates (the ministry of justice draws up a list of all eligible) and other parties adding the rest of the necessary votes unless there’s an actually important reason to veto a candidate, say, for being an ideologue instead of jurist.
That part would be very hard to transplant over to the US. The rest is the culture of the court itself, they’re notorious for being, well, jurists, not giving a rat’s arse about politics leading to decisions like this, blindsiding everyone on either side of the controversy. A judge may come in with political leanings but they’re going to get beaten into shape by the rest of the judges very quickly.
There’s also other structural differences, e.g. the constitutional court pretty much only doing constitutional review, they’re not part of the ordinary instance chain. They have other prerogatives (e.g. banning parties, deciding cases where constitutional organs sue each other) but constitutional review is pretty much their sole bread and butter.