But the PA’s biggest weakness is that it has had to operate on a false assumption. When the PA itself was created in 1994, Palestinian leaders promoted it as a transitional body in a diplomatic process after the Oslo accords that would lead to statehood. Yet the collapse of any worthwhile peace diplomacy and the dwindling prospects of a two-state solution have deprived the PA of its raison d’etre.
As a result, the PA ended up being viewed by Palestinians increasingly as a security sub-contractor for Israel, and in the name of fighting terrorism often imposed arbitrary justice in the West Bank. Lawyers for Justice, a group that documents just such arbitrary justice cases, estimated that in 2022 alone the PA arrested more than 500 Palestinians for anti-Israeli offences. The alternative, the PA argued, would be a third intifada and the collapse of the PA.
This has all taken a massive toll on the PA’s reputation. Respected opinion polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research shows that days before the Hamas assault on Israelis 80% of Palestinians considered the PA corrupt, and 62% viewed it as a liability rather than an asset. None of its main institutions enjoys popular legitimacy.