“The replication crisis is less of a ‘crisis’ in the Lakatosian approach than it is in the Popperian and naïve methodological falsificationism approaches”
@MarkRubin@stsing@philosophyofscience I don’t think Lakatosian philosophy of science underpins concerns about lack of replicability though. Nor even Popper.
When I tell people about the replication crisis, I usually start by telling people about Bem. As I usually put it, the Bem precognition paper either meant that everything we knew about physics is wrong, or everything we knew about how to do social psychology was wrong … and it was probably the second possibility.
I think there are many like me, and this is not a simple falsificationist position
@MarkRubin@stsing@philosophyofscience what the big replication projects like RPP did was that they were too big and splashy to ignore. Bem alone was one paper; RPP was 100 different findings, many of which did not seem solid.
RPP therefore became a lightening rod for discussions of many issues in psych, and replicability was a unifying principle to channel these various discussions
@MarkRubin@stsing@philosophyofscience this included publication bias, p-hacking, the culture of single lone geniuses with their own pet theories, measurement, statistical inference, the reliance on US college students to generalize to the entire world, and a lot more
In my view a replication crisis could be a sign of Pseudoscience in Lokatos' theory. This could also be targeted at subdisciplines. Therefore, the replication crisis in Psychology could well be described as a crisis.
The question is whether the research could turn progressive.
I am not in the position to evaluate Psychology in this regard.